Architecture debt is a form of technical debt that derives from the gap between the intended and the actual architecture design. In this study we measured architecture debt in two ways: 1) in terms of system-wide coupling measures, and 2) in terms of the number and severity of architecture flaws. In recent research it was shown that the amount of architecture debt has a huge impact on software maintainability and evolution. Consequently, reducing debt is expected to make software less costly and more amenable to change. This paper reports on a longitudinal study of a healthcare communications product created by BrightSquid Secure Communications Corp. This young company is facing the typical trade-off problem of desiring responsiveness to change requests, but wanting to avoid the ever-increasing effort that the accumulation of quick-anddirty changes eventually incurs. In the first stage of the study, we analyzed the status of the "before" system, which showed the impacts of change requests. This initial study motivated a more in-depth analysis of architecture debt. The results of this debt analysis were used in the second stage of the work to motivate a comprehensive refactoring of the software system. The third stage was a follow-on architecture debt analysis which quantified the improvements realized. Using this quantitative evidence, augmented by qualitative evidence gathered from indepth interviews with BrightSquid's architects, we present lessons learned about the costs and benefits of paying down architecture debt in practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent research [9] , [24] has shown that architecture design flaws accumulate in software projects over time, and that the accumulation of these flaws creates a specific kind of technical debt [2] that we call architecture debt. architecture debt exists and grows because design flaws are easy to introduce unnoticed; they are introduced by the maintenance activities of programmers as they go about their "main" business of adding features and fixing bugs. These design flaws erode the quality of a software system and propagate bugginess among the system's source files. These flawed structures have been shown to incur high maintenance penalties [6] , [15] increased numbers of bugs, increased numbers of changes, and consequently more lines of code committed and more effort. This additional effort is the interest that a project pays on the incurred debt. Removing these flaws requires effort, in the form of refactoring, and the benefits of refactoring have historically been difficult for architects and project managers to quantify or justify; they simply do not have the data and analytic tools available to quantify the costs and benefits of a proposed refactoring. For this reason large-scale refactorings to remove debt are exceedingly rare.
In this paper we report on the results of a longitudinal study at a company that produces secure communication software for health information. BrightSquid 1 is a global provider of HIPAA-compliant 2 communication solutions, providing messaging and large file transfer for medical and dental professionals since 2009. Secure-Mail is BrightSquid's core communication and collaboration platform. It offers role-based API access to a catalog of services and automated workflows. Their platform supports aggregating, generating, and sharing protected health information across communities of health care patients, practitioners, and organizations. BrightSquid has been working on a number of projects to achieve these business goals, and this study is focused on analyzing their core software platform. The company is facing the typical problem of young software companies: they need to quickly enter a competitive market with innovative product ideas to produce revenue in the near-term; they need to satisfy current users and their expectations. At the same time, the company is facing the demands of growing their customer base and satisfying their requirements [8] . As BrightSquid's product manager puts it: "The job of the start-up is to find a sustainable business model-in other words, to discover an important and urgent problem, that a defined and accessible segment of customers will pay for to have solved. The likelihood of finding the right problem and customer segment, let alone building the right and enduring technology solution on the first try is about 0%. This means that if ignored, the likelihood of architecture debt in a start-up is conversely 100%. Many start-ups embrace agile software development methodologies, where the typical attitude is that solution architecture evolves organically. Evolution is at the mercy a continually changing environment, so key start-up characteristics comprise survival, flexibility, speed, and a revolving door of opportunities, stakeholders and employees."
The paper reports on the results of a longitudinal study of BrightSquid's main software platform. In this study we performed an architecture analysis of the module structure of the platform before and after refactoring, with the goal of identifying and quantifying the architecture debt in the before and after states. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first real-world empirical study of architecture debt over a long period of time with the goal of demonstrating the benefit of improving a product's software architecture by paying down architecture debt (through refactoring).
Specifically this study is focused on answering three main research questions:
RQ1: Do quantitative measures of architecture complexity change significantly before/after refactoring? RQ2: Do quantitative project measures of quality change significantly before/after refactoring? RQ3: Do qualitative perceptions of architectural quality change before/after and does this match the quantitative changes?
The results of this longitudinal study are, we believe, quite dramatic. BrightSquid, by paying down its architecture debt, improved the maintainability of their code based significantly. Velocity went up significantly: the average time to resolve new issues in the after version went down by 72% and build time was reduced by over 83%, as compared with the before version. In addition, the number of bugs resolved per month nearly doubled and the lines of code required to make these fixes were reduced by 2/3.
In the remainder of this paper we will describe Bright-Squid's business context, the details of the longitudinal analyses that we conducted, and the results that we obtained.
II. CONTEXT AND BASELINE ANALYSIS
This study has been done as part of a three year collaborative program designed to analyze the impact of code changes at BrightSquid. The project had multiple phases and was kicked off in the Summer of 2016. As part of this project, we studied the status of architecture debt and its impact on code maintainability at BrightSquid. The timeline of this project in regards to the scope of the paper is presented in Figure 3 .
Inspired by the work of Begel and Zimmermann [1] , in the initial phase of this project we performed a survey that included all of BrightSquid's developers, project and product managers (a total of nine employees) to pinpoint the most interesting questions in the domain of the project. Among the 21 stated questions the most frequently asked questions were:
"How extensible is BrightSquid's software in comparison to some type of recognized standard?"
"What is the general cost of change on this software in comparison with some type of accepted standard?"
"What areas of code / services are non-performant?" "What areas of the code-base are not utilized?"
To answer these questions, we performed a preliminary analysis of the code for the "Platform" project which includes the main shared functionality of the project. We analyzed the code changes maintained in GitHub and traced them to the change requests maintained on the project's Jira issue tracking system, looking into all the (Java and Javascript) files. An overview of the results is shown in Figure 1 . We found that the 10% of the commits with the highest churn (changed lines of code) were applied to just 270 files (2.5% of all files). The 25% of the commits with the highest churn were applied to 26.1% of the files (2,870 files). Our results also showed that 27.1% of the files (2,977 files) were never changed after creation. And we found that 0.4% of all the files have changed with all the change requests. The distribution of churn for all the files is shown in Figure 3 -(a). As we will show in Section V, these are all symptoms of architecture debt. For example, these 0.4% of files that are constantly changing are all members of architecture roots [22] .
Extent of change for all files
# of mutually changed files between two releases Ranking of issues in terms of churn created and their nature R1  R3  R5  R7  R9  R11  R13  R15  R17  R19  R21  R23  R25  R27  R29  R31  R33   R1   R3   R5   R7   R9   R11   R13   R15   R17   R19   R21   R23 Among the files in the Platform project, 49.1% of them had only a single contributor-the creator-and were never touched by any other person. Looking across all releases and all the files that have been changed by each pair of non-consecutive releases showed that there is a 34% overlap between changed files on average. If we include consecutive releases, this number goes up to 41%. In addition, we present a heatmap for the mutual file changes in Figure 1 -(b). Figure  1 -(c) shows the types of issues with respect to code churn for the 10 th percentile of the churn.
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These initial analyses led us to believe that BrightSquid's code base had serious structural problems, which motivated us to perform an architecture analysis.
III. ARCHITECTURE DEBT ANALYSIS
In our architecture analysis, we attempted to detect, measure, and assess the consequences of architecture debt in two ways: 1) by calculating architecture-based maintainability metrics on the before-and after-refactoring versions of Bright-Squid's software, and 2) by identifying the architecture flaws and architecture roots in their software.
A. Maintainability metrics suite
We employed two state-of-the-art architecture maintainability metrics to measure and compare the platform's maintainability before and after refactoring:
Decoupling Level (DL), introduced by Mo et al. [16] . Decoupling Level measures how well a software system is decoupled into independent modules, using Baldwin and Clark's design rule theory as the underlying theoretical foundation: the more active, independent, and small modules there are, the higher option values can be produced. Based on this rationale, Mo et al.'s algorithm first clusters source files into a design rule hierarchy (DRH), a hierarchical structure in which (1) files in lower layers can only depend on files in higher layers; (2) files within the same layer are clustered into mutually independent modules. Based on DRH, DL is calculated based on the design rule theory: the larger a module is, the lower its DL; the more independent modules there are, the higher the DL; the more dependents a module has, the lower its DL.
Propagation Cost (PC), proposed by MacCormack et al. [13] to measure how tightly coupled a system is. The calculation of PC is based on a matrix model of the dependencies among files. The rows and columns of the matrix are labeled with the files in the same order, and each nonempty cell in the matrix indicates an indirect or direct dependency between the file on the row and the file on the column. MacCormack et al.'s algorithm starts from the direct dependency relations among files in a system, and calculates the transitive closure of the matrix by adding indirect dependencies to it until no more dependencies can be added. The final matrix thus contains all direct and indirect dependencies, PC is calculated as the number of nonempty cells divided by the total number of cells in the final matrix. PC has been used by researchers and practitioners to analyze large projects with similar domains and sizes [12] .
These metrics measure software from two complementary aspects: the level of decoupling vs. the level of coupling. In all systems the higher the DL, and lower the PC, and vice versa. These metrics are architectural because they measure the module view formed by the project's source files.
B. architecture flaws
Following the work of Mo et al. [15] , we detected the following 6 types of architecture design flaws from Brighsquid's software base: Clique: A group of files that are interconnected, forming a strongly connected component. Package cycle: typically the package structure of a software system should form a hierarchical structure. A cycle among packages is therefore considered to be harmful. Improper inheritance: we consider an inheritance hierarchy to be problematic if it falls into one of the following cases:
(1) a parent class depends on one or more of its children;
(2) the client of the class hierarchy uses/calls both a parent and one or more of its children, thus violating the Liskov Substitution Principle. Modularity violation: Modules designed properly with information hiding in mind should be able to change independently from each other. If two structurally independent modules in a DRSpace are shown to change together frequently in the revision history, it means that they are not truly independent from each other. Often, these modules have harmful implicit dependencies that should be removed. We call this flaw modularity violation. In this project, since the number of changes and co-changes are few, due to the relatively short revision history, we consider two files to have modularity violations if they have changed together at least 2 times but have no structural dependency on each other. Crossing: if a file has many dependents and depends on many other files, that is, having high fan-in and high fan-out, then this file will appear to be at the center of a cross in its DSM. If the file at the center also changes frequently with it dependents and the files it depends on, we call these files form a Crossing. An example crossing from BrightSquid's platform is shown in Figure 2 . Unstable interface: if a highly influential file is changed frequently with other files that directly or indirectly depend on it, then we call it an Unstable Interface. In this project, we consider a file to be an unstable interface if it changes together with at least 5 other files two times or more.
C. Architecture Roots
Xiao et al. [22] proposed a new software architecture model, design rule space (DRSpace), which contain a set of related files. These DRSpaces can model various aspects of a software system, such as a feature, a pattern, etc. A software architecture can thus be viewed as multiple overlapping DRSpaces. They also define a new concept called architecture roots (or roots for short), to capture the architectural relations between the project's most error-prone files. An architecture root is a DRSpace that captures a set of error-prone/change-prone files.
Fig. 2: A Design Structure Matrix with a Crossing Flaw (highlighted)
Several studies (e.g. [22] , [9] ) have shown that five roots can typically cover 50% to 90% of the most error-prone files in a system. This result implies that most error-prone files in a system are usually architecturally connected. And the more error-prone the files are, the more likely that these files are architecturally connected, so that bugs propagate through the connections. Following recent research [17] , [9] , we detected the set of roots in the BrightSquid platform that cover at least 80% of all the error-prone files, before and after refactoring. By comparing these before and after roots, and by interviewing the practitioners, we could determine if these roots do indeed reveal the problematic areas of the system.
IV. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
A. Main Phases
The research study commenced in June 2016. Its main objective was to provide a methodology that we called Intelligent Change Management that would aid BrightSquid in responding more quickly to requested changes. The cornerstone of this strategy was to identify and pay down architecture debt so that the company could increase its feature-delivery and bug-fixing velocity.
From the perspective of identifying and paying down architecture debt, the study was structured into three phases (see Figure 3 ). Observ.
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Jan. 2018
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Six months Six months in Section II, were collected and analyzed. These findings served as a strong motivation for the company to look more deeply into technical debt and its root causes and a decision was made to analyze the root causes of architecture debt. 2) architecture analysis before refactoring. (July 2017.) At this time an in-depth architecture analysis was performed.
The key attributes studied in this architecture debt analysis were those described in Section III: we captured the project's DL and PC scores, we calculated the architecture roots, and we calculated the architecture flaws. 3) Refactoring and repeated architecture debt analysis.
(January to August 2018.) During this period, given the results from Phase 2, an extensive architecture refactoring was undertaken by BrightSquid. The refactoring done in Phase 3 served multiple purposes: (i) reducing the technical (architectural) debt that had accumulated over time, (ii) adding new functionality in response to major emergent customer requirements, and (iii) fixing bugs. This process included purging of packages, consolidating tightly coupled functionality together, cleaning up inheritance structures, and purging complex and obsolete business logic that had accumulated over the years.
B. The Process of architecture debt Analysis
To assess if and how the refactoring activity had affected the architecture, and, most importantly, the maintainability of the architecture, we conducted both quantitative and qualitative analyses. For the qualitative analysis, which is independent of the architecture debt analysis, we conducted a survey and multiple interviews to collect the opinions and experiences of the Brighsquid team, so that we could better understand the implications and outcomes of the refactoring activity. For example, we wanted to learn if the BrightSquid developers felt that it had become easier to maintain the system after refactoring, and if they thought that the 3 months of refactoring was worthwhile.
For quantitative analysis, we analyzed two versions of the system-before and after refactoring-as well as 6 months of revision history after each of these versions. In both analyses, we employed DV8 3 -a commercial version of the Titan architecture analysis tool suite [22] , [23] -to analyze the architecture of each system version to assess architecture debt. To support this analysis we collected project history data, including issue records and git logs, so that we could quantitatively assess how maintenance activities have changed before and after refactoring. Since the refactoring began on January 8 th , 2018, for the before-refactoring analysis we analyzed the evolution history of the system 6 months prior to January 8 th , and used a release in July 2017 as the target subject for architecture analysis of the "before" state. The refactoring was completed by March 1 st , 2018. We analyzed the version released on that date, and 6 months of project history after that date, to assess the impacts of the refactoring.
For each of these snapshots, we used DV8 to analyze the architecture from the three aspects elaborated in the previous section, collecting: 1) DL and PC scores, 2) the number of instances of architecture flaws and their scopes, and 3) the instances of architecture roots and their scopes. In particular, we were keen to know if the architecture problems we identified in the "before" state had been resolved during the refactoring process and if new problems emerged after refactoring. The output of this analysis allow us to answer RQ1.
For these two periods of history, in addition to counting the total numbers of issues opened and fixed and the numbers of bug issues opened and fixed, we also calculated the changed lines of code (LOC) to fix each bug. We further counted the average numbers of days required for bugs to be fixed in the before and after versions. Our rationale for these measures is that if the architecture refactoring was successful it would become easier for developers to find and fix bugs and to develop new features. In this case the time and LOC spent should be significantly shortened after refactoring. The output of this analysis will allow us to answer RQ2.
V. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Now we present our results, organized according to the research questions stated in Section I. RQ1 aims to quantitatively measure changes in architecture debt as reflected in BrightSquid's source code; RQ2 aims to quantitatively measure changes in maintainability and productivity outcomes as reflected in the revision history; and RQ3 explores the development team's experiences and assesses if the objective numbers match their experiences and intuitions.
RQ1: Do quantitative measures of architecture debt change significantly before/after refactoring?
We summarize the architecture measures and debts in Tables  I and II . After refactoring, the number of code files shrunk by 58.5%. We found just three architecture roots (containing 296 Files) that collectively account for 80% of bug fixes. By contrast there were five roots (containing 295 files) before refactoring. In total, 37% of the files covered 80% of the bugs after refactoring while the number was 17% before the refactoring. After comparing these roots, we realize that some of the roots remain in the after version, meaning that the focal points of the system are centered around these 296 files, which could be determined by the nature of the application. Here we observe that the Pareto rule applies for architecture debt: the top few architecture roots always count for about 80% of the bugs, either before or after refactoring.
Analysis of the decoupling level showed that the modularity of the system decreased slightly, as the DL score reduced by 3%, and the PC score remained the same, at 6%. The small difference of DL could be caused by the fact that many redundant components (which may be independent, and contributed to a higher DL) were removed during the refactoring. But a difference of 3% is essentially noise.
These system-wide measures-the DL/PC scores, as well as the root analysis-do not reflect the changes in architecture directly. These are overall average health measures. But in architectural health the architecture flaws, which provide a more fine-grained analysis of the architecture, changed drastically. To make an analogy, a human might be mostly healthyhaving good blood pressure, low cholesterol, proper kidney function, etc.-but a brain tumor can undermine and render irrelevant all of those other measures.
Concretely, the number of cliques was reduced by 41.1% and the # of files impacted by them was reduced by 63.3%. Both the number of unhealthy inheritances as well as the number of files affected by them reduced by almost 50%. The number of unstable interfaces was reduced from 12 to 8, and the number of files influenced by these interfaces reduced by 54%. The 79.3% reduction in the number of crossings was accompanied by a 87.8% reduction in the number of files Table I . Why should we care about reducing flaws? Let us consider a specific example: the crossing shown in Figure 2 . This crossing is centered around the file "User.java". In the before state of the system User.java was the center of a crossing containing 107 files. That is, in the before state, 106 other files either depended on User.java, or User.java depended on them. If User.java changed frequently-and it did-then many other files were potentially affected. In the after state, just 35 other files are coupled with User.java. This kind of reduction in complexity that we get by paying down the debt associated with architecture flaws means that, in general, changes are less likely to "ripple" to other files which in turn reduces the cost and complexity of those changes.
The refactoring activities were recorded as 106 change requests, which consumed 563.8 person hours of effort. We linked these refactoring issues to the commits that were related to 7 cliques, 23 crossings, and 4 unstable interfaces that we detected from architecture debt analysis before refactoring. We found that about 34% of the commits, 28% of the time, and 37% of lines of code during the refactoring period were related to the removal of architecture debt.
We looked into the time to fix issues in the files related to the refactored cliques, crossings, and unstable interfaces. We could find 13 issues after refactoring and compared them with the 51 issues related to these files before refactoring. Our comparison showed that the average time to close the issues relate to these critical files dropped by 72%.
The average time needed to close issues before and after refactoring was reduced by 72%.
RQ2: Do quantitative measures of project quality change significantly before/after refactoring?
If the refactoring was successful, it should become easier for developers to add features or fix bugs. Here we use two proxies to quantify the ease of maintenance activities:
(1) churn (lines of code changed) per issue. The rationale here is that the easier it is to fix a bug or to add new features, the fewer LOC will be needed to close a change request. If we only consider bug issues: the average bug-fixing churn after refactoring is about 34 LOC per issue, compared to 102 LOC before refactoring. It appears, and the development team believed, that the improved architecture made bug-fixing substantially more efficient. If we consider all issue types, and not just bugs, the averages are still improved: 208 LOC before refactoring and 156 after refactoring.
(2) # days needed per issue. The rationale here is that the easier it is to fix a bug or to add new features, the less time needed to close a change request. The data shows that the average bug-fixing duration reduced 30%, dropping from 10 days before to 7 days after. The productivity of the team improved due to both reduced build time and reduced bugfixing duration. The box plot distribution of the time spent to close a change request before and after refactoring and the churn are shown in Figure 4 .
We also observed that before refactoring, 71 change requests (including 24 bug reports), involving code changes in the platform were resolved in five months, compared to 150 change requests (including 78 bug issues) after refactoring in a similar five month period. These numbers indicate thatwith the same team size-after refactoring more issues are addressed and less code is "spent" to address each issue.
The time and lines of code needed to close change requests are significantly lower than the required time and lines of code before refactoring (p-value = 0.001 and 0.002). Considering these measures as proxies for productivity, the analysis of architecture debt correctly motivated the architecture refactoring to increase developer productivity.
So far these quantitative analyses indicate a very successful refactoring activity, both reflected in the record of revision history and in the significant reduction of architecture flaws. Next we assess if these numbers match developer intuitions.
RQ3: Do qualitative perceptions of architectural quality change before/after and does this match the quantitative changes?
To collect feedback from the development team, we conducted a structured interview. The goal of this interview was to qualitatively assess the perceived impact of refactoring. We wanted to understand if maintaining the system became no- ticeably better, in terms of bug-fixing and productivity. And we wanted to understand how much the developers thought that these improvements were triggered by the results of the Phase 2 analysis. To do this we interviewed key project stakeholders. Below, we first discuss the structured interview results, along with the descriptions provided by the participants, and then summarize the results of the follow up unstructured interview. All participants were asked seven yes-no questions, where they were also given the opportunity to add some elaborations for the answers given. The product manager, software architect, and two back-end developers attended this interview. We asked them to consider all the questions in terms of the system state six months before and six months after refactoring.
Time spent on closing change requests
While our quantitative results showed that "the # of change request opened before refactoring is less than the # of change requests opened after refactoring" in BrightSquid, the product manager and a developer considered this a misleading characterization. The product manager argued that intuitively this seemed wrong as after refactoring the architecture and business. rules were simplified and having less code, tables, and tests should result in fewer issues. However, the architect attributed the main cause of this increase to the introduction of new features. When comparing the status of change requests before and after refactoring, all the participants agreed with our finding that "the portion of fixed change requests is higher after refactoring." The implication is that a desirable outcome had been achieved: more features were able to be added (with the same team size) after refactoring.
One of the surprising results was that "the number of bugs opened after refactoring is significantly more than the number of bugs before." The software architect considered this to be consistent with his own perception. He stated that adding a large amount of new functionality caused a lot of new bugs in the short term, while the old functionality was fairly stable. This finding is also consistent with other studies of refactoring: bugs often go up in the short term as the new, refactored functionality is being integrated and debugged, but this is not a long-term phenomenon [10] . All the participants confirmed our finding that the ratio of fixed bugs to open bugs was higher after refactoring (in comparison to before). This effect was caused by two related factors: the refactoring both reduced code dependencies and increased productivity. The participants also confirmed our finding that "the time needed to fix a bug after refactoring is less than the time needed before refactoring". This was again believed to be the case because the refactoring reduced dependencies, and so bugs were more localized. However, the increase in bug-fixing velocity was also aided by the fact that creating the builds became 83.3% faster after refactoring.
When it comes to validating our findings regarding the amount of changes, all participants agreed that "the number of files changed per bug is significantly less after refactoring" and "the number of lines of code to change (churn) per bug is significantly less after refactoring." As shown by our results, these values were significantly higher before the refactoring and, once again, this was attributed to the higher code com-plexity and higher inter-file dependencies in the before version.
We wrap up our qualitative analysis with a quotation from the BrightSquid's senior architect:
"Having an architecture debt analysis report that goes through coupling, circular relationships, and dependencies confirmed our hypotheses and we were able to convey to the top management that we need to do the refactoring as quick as possible."
In addition to comparing our results with the perception of developers in previous subsection, we performed semistructured interviews with two key actors in the company: the product manager and the chief architect. Below we present each of the questions accompanied by the consolidated results of the interview discussions we had with these BrightSquid managers.
Q 1 : How did you use the report from Phase 2 to decide if/when/how/where to re-factor? "We used the report to confirm our own hypotheses on technical debt issues, including circular relationships in our code base. We did not use specific report findings to determine where we should focus our attention. Instead, there were product and feature changes that drove our decisions regarding code, files and tables to deprecate and/or re-factor."
To what extend did the report guide you to scrutinize parts or aspects of the architecture that you might not have otherwise focused on? The team had a general understanding of the architectural issues inherent in the code base. Business decisions regarding product and feature deprecation drove decisions more than the report. Q 3 : Did the results of architecture debt analysis affect your priorities? Confirmation and quantification of technical debt through the report made a stronger business case to focus more of the technical team's time on overtly addressing technical debt. Q 4 : Did the results of architecture debt analysis affect your refactoring strategies? "The architectural debt analysis initiated the refactoring, and the report was used to convince management to allocate resources for refactoring. However, the analysis results were not taken one by one as defining tasks for developers. Instead, BrightSquid was considering the total results reported by architectural debt analysis" (Product manager). Q 5 : Did the report highlight any problems that were not already known/obvious to team members? The team was generally aware of the technical debt issues in our code base. The report was very helpful in overtly quantifying the amount and extent of actual technical debt. Q 6 : Do you think there is a positive return-on-investment from running architecture debt analysis and the return you received out of it? Very much so. Return-on-Investment includes (i) Faster builds: over 50% reduction in building code and (ii) Reduction in files, schemes and tables resulted in simplified architecture. Consequently less time is required to design, write code, test, build and maintain product and features. Q 7 : What do you think had the biggest impact from running the debt analysis? By confirming both the level and extent of technical debt, it was easier to acquire business commitment to address technical debt through a more cohesive rather than piecemeal approach. Q 8 : What would have happened without it? In the absence of the report, we would have been more likely to address technical debt in a piecemeal fashion, and dragged this out over a longer period of time.
As a typical software project that has evolved for years, most maintenance costs in the BrightSquid Platform have been focused on just a few file groups, as shown in the Architecture Root analysis. These Roots are typically the root causes of much of the project's technical debt. All after all, as the BrightSquid manager said: "Our code base was a historical record of our quest to find the right market, problem and solution. architecture debt analysis quantitatively exposed how and where this inflated our cost of change." VI. DISCUSSION Studying a software organization's improvement efforts over time allows us to better understand its impact on success [7] . In our longitudinal study, we covered a period of two years. Any real-world organization does not provide a controlled setting, and this was true for our study. As part of an academicindustry partnership project, we were unable to control all the confounding factors such as adding or deleting new functionality. A multitude of changes related to resources, development, and business goals occurred concurrently. The impact of such changes is even more substantial for smaller companies such as BrightSquid. Consequently, no strict causality statements can be made. Nevertheless, by triangulating all of the evidence that we collected, a coherent picture emerges.
We argue that the architecture debt analysis had an impact on company's decision-makers and this caused them to decide to refactor and guided them in how to focus their refactoring efforts. This refactoring, in turn, helped give the company the ability to mature their technology and better adjust to the competitive health care market.
Refactoring and removing technical debt are a priority and an ongoing effort for BrightSquid, but these needed to be balanced against the business's other priorities-delivering customer-facing features. BrightSquid's stakeholders have seen, however, significant benefits to the business and the development team in reducing complexity, removing architecture flaws, and simplifying or removing obsolete business rules. The refactoring efforts helped to increase the Bright-Squid team's productivity and ability to adapt quickly to new business requirements.
We argue that the overall message presented in this paperthat architecture debt was weighing BrightSquid down and that the refactoring removed substantial portions of this debtis the result of combining various independent streams of reasoning and evidence: 1) Quantitative analysis: This analysis revealed improvements to both the architecture and the maintainability of the platform software. This analysis was based on measuring key attributes of the system's software architecture-its decoupling level, roots, and architecture flaws-and key outcome measures, such as lines of code, bugs, and velocity.
Our study was limited to BrightSquid's platform project and focused on its Java code, but this was justifiable as the platform is the most critical software component for the company. We observed that the refactoring reduced the number of blocker and critical bugs by 11.3%. Still, a more comprehensive analysis including other parts of the system is needed to increase the validity of our findings. In particular, the substantial reduction in size of the platform is a confounding factor that could directly impact the quantitative measures we reported in our paper.
2) Qualitative analysis: This evidence was based on performing a series of interviews with key members of the project, asking for their perceptions surrounding the relevance, utility, and accuracy of the architecture debt analysis. This allowed us to assess the perceived value of the analyses that we performed. Even though we had just four participants, the clear trend was that the architecture analysis confirmed our hypotheses and gave BrightSquid the evidence that they needed for their decision making. In addition, the analysis allowed the team to argue for the urgency of performing a substantial refactoring and guided them in parts of their refactoring. While these forms of interviews are subject to validity threats, when combined with the quantitative results a consistent picture emerges. 3) Preponderance of evidence: Finally, we argue that the results achieved here, in terms of the reduction in architecture flaws and the subsequent gains in productivity, are consistent with a large and growing body of research evidence-that technical and architecture debt matters and paying it down can catalyze substantial productivity improvements (e.g. [2] , [3] , [5] , [15] , [20] ). The value and insight gained from running architecture debt analyses has been shown in other studies. In particular it has been shown that the number of architecture flaws per file is very strongly correlated with bugs, changes, and churn/effort [6] , [15] . In this study, for the first time, we performed multiple analyses of a single system over time. In particular, we measured the architecture debt and productivity measures before and after refactoring. Clearly we can not argue for strict causality-that the refactoring caused the productivity improvements-because our analysis did not define and control every step of the experimental setting. However, there are several pieces of qualitative and quantitative evidence, along with our prior corpus of research results, that point to the impact of refactoring on team productivity in BrightSquid. This gives us confidence in arguing that reducing architecture debt has had a positive influence on productivity and quality measures for the company.
Having seen the value of this analysis, BrightSquid is now considering embarking on a program of continuous architecture measurement and benchmarking. Measurement, particularly if it is fully automated and connected with project triggers (for example, a nightly build), can quickly notify project stakeholders if there has been a degradation in the architecture-perhaps the introduction of a new architecture flaw. Benchmarking can help a company understand how it is situated in terms of its competitive landscape. So, for example, a company can track its DL score over time and use this to determine if any mitigations are required. This is no different from what you do when you go to the doctor. The doctor analyzes your health via a spectrum of analyses and tests and notes differences from your last checkup (for example, a dramatic increase in blood pressure or cholesterol levels) and uses broad benchmarks to decide if an intervention is necessary (for example, a total cholesterol level of 220 is slightly high but within the normal range for adults). All of the architecture analyses presented in this paper are fully automated and so they can provide exactly the data needed for such measurement and benchmarking (e.g. [16] ).
VII. RELATED WORK
Architectural Debt Analysis. In the past decade, a number of methods have been proposed to analyze technical debt within software systems [4] , [24] , [25] . DV8 and Titan have been used to analyze and detect architectural debt in both open source and (closed source) industrial projects. Kazman et al. [9] presented the experiences of detecting and quantifying architectural debts in Softserve, as well as a return on investment estimation of the benefit that would accrue to potential refactoring activities. The recent work of Mo et al. [17] reported the experience of applying the DV8 tool suite to eight projects of various sizes and domains within ABB Corporation, and showed that the architecture analysis helped practitioners to make decisions on if and where to refactor.
Carriere et al. [3] also proposed and applied a cost-benefit model to estimate benefits of reducing the level of coupling in an e-commerce architecture. Their work focused on coupling only, rather than on identifying architecture flaws and pinpointing the locations to refactor.
Curtis et al. [5] proposed a model to estimate the amount of technical debt in terms of cost calculated from source code static relations. Nord et al. [20] created a formula to estimate the impact of technical debt on architecture, which could be used to optimize long-term product evolution. Similarly to Curtis et al. [5] , their work does not detect the location and specific problems that need to be treated.
Martini and Bosch [14] proposed and validated AnaCon-Debt, a method that has been applied to 12 case systems within six companies. Their experience showed that it can help practitioners to decide if and when to refactor architectural debt items. In comparison with Titan and DV8, the architectural debt in their work had to be manually identified by architects.
Of all these previous cases studies, none of them presented the experiences before and after the actual refactoring activities, although many of them demonstrated that their approaches can help the team to make refactoring decisions. The work we are presenting here is, to our knowledge, the first report of analyzing a system before and after refactoring, in terms of architecture debt variations and maintenance effort variations, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
As described in [21] , case studies in software engineering often just examine small-scale systems with relatively low research effort. There are few longitudinal case studies (with some notable exceptions such as [11] ) that address larger scale, complex phenomena where there is a need to collect both quantitative and qualitative data. As mentioned by [21] , the "software engineering research community both recognizes the demands of longitudinal case study research and also that the community can only rarely allocate sufficient resources toward such studies".
Our current study covers a period of two years and reports on the process and major findings from identifying and paying down the architecture debt in the module structure of Bright-Squid's platform. In this study we have observed substantial quality and productivity improvements made over the period of intervention and analysis. Understanding the architecture flaws and initiating refactoring helped the company to reduce their build time by about 83%, reduced the average time to resolve issues by 72%, and reduce bug-fixing effort from an average of 102 LOC per bug to just 34. How do we know that these improvements all accrued to the architecture debt repayment? Again, we can not claim causality based on a single case study. However, we believe that we can make an argument based on a preponderance of evidence all pointing in the same direction. The number and size of the architecture flaws went down, productivity measures went up, the key stakeholders felt that the refactoring benefited their ability to manage the code base.
And finally, all of this is consistent with the evidence collected over the analyses of hundreds of open source and industrial projects in our prior work which shows a very strong correlation between architecture flaws and productivity measures [6] , [15] . Thus, although this is just a single case study, it presents a consistent picture-that architecture debt matters and that it is possible to pay it down, via refactoring, and achieve significant benefits.
Many young companies embrace agile software development methodologies, where the typical attitude is that solution architecture evolves organically. This organic evolution is a key characteristic of start-ups and is needed for survival, flexibility, speed, and a revolving door of opportunities, stakeholders and employees. The research presented here is part of a longer term project with a young software company-BrightSquid-to improve their software processes. For example we developed ESSMArT for automatic escalation and summarization of user requests [18] and implemented a tagging method for better estimation of effort needed to close a change request [19] . The research reported here is a step towards our overall goal of Intelligent Change Management.
The job of the young software company is to find a sustainable business model-in other words, to discover an important and urgent problem-that a defined and accessible segment of customers will pay for. But this often seems to be inherently in conflict with a disciplined approach towards software engineering in general and with the management of technical debt in particular. Here we showed that, with the right tooling, it is possible to have both discipline and agility. The final outcome of this study is that it made believers out of BrightSquid's management. Thus we will conclude with a quotation from the product owner.
"The approach expressed in the paper to analyze architecture debt provides immutable guide-stones to navigate through the mutable destinations on the road to discovering the actual sustainable business model. If we declare the components of your analysis to be essential non-functional requirements (clique, package cycle, improper inheritance, modularity violation, crossing, unstable interface) with overtly declared targets, then regardless of the markets, problems or solutions visited on the journey, the disciplined start-up that regularly manages these non-functional requirements is much better equipped to avoid architecture debt accumulation in the first place. As long as acceptable thresholds are maintained, the start-up can be confident that the architecture supports, rather than thwarts success. Quick and dirty fixes can consequently be exposed as what they truly are -incremental, short-sighted steps down a slippery slope that inflates the costs of change. In short, An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."
